This article examines the role of scepticism in the Islamic philosophical tradition. It begins with a treatment of the origins and purpose of these discussions in classical kalām (c. 800–1100 CE). Then it moves on to the more mature discussions treating five forms of scepticism in the post‐classical period (c.1200–1800 CE), with the aim of demonstrating how they construed scepticism, the arguments for and against it, and what purposes scepticism played in their system. Three of these types of scepticism are (...) unrestricted, meaning that their denial of knowledge is universal. The other two types are restricted to a denial of inferential knowledge, either entirely, or in certain subjects such as metaphysics and natural philosophy. The discussion will focus on two of the most widely studied works of kalām: Saʿd al‐Din al‐Taftāzānī's Sharḥ al‐ʿAqāʾid al‐Nasafiyya and Jalāl al‐Dīn al‐Dawānī's Sharḥ al‐ʿAqāʾid al‐ʿAḍudiyya, including some of their super‐commentaries. (shrink)

It was widely believed among post-classical thinkers that the classical Mutakallimūn held that the cause of dependence of an effect on a cause was its origination, or a combination of origination and contingency, or its contingency on condition of its origination. Some post-classical thinkers, led by al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjānī, went further by interpreting Abu’l-Hasan al-Ashʿarī’s denial of the persistence of accidents was a consequence of his view that origination was the cause of dependence. This is because the origination view entailed (...) that the world was no longer in need of the Creator after its origination, and thus, him and his followers sought to deflect this consequence by holding that accidents do not persist, and since the persistence of substances was dependent on those accidents, and accidents do not persist more than one moment, those substances remained in need of the Creator for those accidents after their origination. This article seeks to investigate this analysis of the Shaykh al-Ashʿarī’s view, alongside the leading scholars of his school. After examining the original sources of classical Ashʿarī thinkers, along with the Baṣran Mu’tazila, and the texts of Ibn Sina, it becomes clear that the Ashꜥarīs did not hold that accidents did not persist in order to deflect that purported consequence. Indeed, it becomes clear that they did not hold that origination was the cause of dependence, but rather, that it was contingency. As for the Mu’tazila, they are explicit that the cause of dependence is origination, and that is based on their view on the reality of the nonexistent. Since essences are real in their state of nonexistence, they are not in need of a cause; and everything that obtains for those essences after they come into exist are entailments of that essence; thus, they only stand in need of a cause in their origination, that is, going from nonexistence into existence. Indeed, they are also explicit that effects do not need the Creator after their origination, and they clarified this through a comparison with a builder and a building. Indeed, the classical Ashꜥarīs criticized them for this, just as Ibn Sina did in the Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt, al-Najāt, and al-Shifā. Thus, those post-classical scholars generalized the statement that origination is the cause of dependence to all classical mutakallimūn, and then they interpreted Ashʿarī’s motivation behind the denial of the persistence of accidents in accordance with that. The truth, however, is that his view on accidents is based on contingency, and that is because a substance is possible of persistence and possible of non-persistence, and therefore, it stands in need of cause to determine its state in the subsequent moment. That determination must entail something additional to the substance itself, otherwise, the effect is redundant. That additional property must be an accident, and since it is impossible for an accident to subsist in an accident, it is not possible for an accident to persist, because it is not receptive to the property which entails persistence; meanwhile, it is possible for substances, because they can sustain accidents. (shrink)

This article examines the development and critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. There are two basic positions on analogical arguments: one holds that if analogical arguments yield certainty, then they are analyzable as deductive inferences, rendering the analogy itself redundant. Proponents of this view thus hold that if the analogy is useful at all, it will never yield the certainty demanded in the rational sciences; another holds that the analogy remains useful even when the argument is deductively sound, (...) either because the universal premise is epistemically dependent on the source case, or, because the source case is useful in dialectical contexts. The exploration of these themes will center around Juwaynī’s formalization and subsequent critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been notable interest in Islamic philosophy and theology from an analytic and not merely historical perspective. One important area of research that has garnered a great deal of research is the arguments for the existence of God. Recent work by Hannah Erlwein seeks to argue that this research has been in vain, for there are no arguments for the existence of God in classical Islamic thought. This paper analyzes Erlwein’s strategies in justifying this position, revealing (...) that her research ignores an enormous amount of evidence that runs contrary to her thesis, in addition to demonstrating many of the errors and shortcomings in her work. Most disturbingly, the book seeks to present the Islamic philosophical tradition as fideistic and unintellectual based on a series of contrived interpretations of rather clear texts. In response, this paper demonstrates the importance of independent inquiry in the Islamic tradition by looking at a wide range of different relevant texts. (shrink)

Klasik Sünnî kelâmın sıfatların ‘ne Tanrı’nın aynı ne de Tanrı'dan ayrı' olduğunu iddia eden ilâhî sıfatlar teorisi, üçüncü halin imkansızlığı yasasının inkarı anlamına gelecek şekilde yorumlanmıştır. Nitekim bu iddiada olan yazarlar, böyle bir teoriyi dışarıda bırakacak şekilde yeni bir kelâm inşa etme iddiasındadır. Yazar, böyle bir iddiayı kendinde anlamsız görmekle birlikte, klasik kelâm nazariyesinde de bir temeli olmadığını iddia etmektedir. Bu makale, ‘gayr’ın anlamı hakkında ayrıntılı bir inceleme sunmakta ve birçok metinsel kanıtla, klasik ilâhî sıfatlar teorisinin yalnızca özdeşliğin ve ilâhî (...) zâttan ayrılabilirliğin inkarı anlamına geldiğini öne sürmektedir. Bu makale, gayr teriminin metafizik, teoloji ve doğa felsefesi bağlamlarında da geçerli olduğunu göstermektedir. “Bir şey bir diğerinin ne aynı ne de ayrıdır” formülü, bir öznenin kendisinden zorunlu ve ayrılmaz olan herhangi bir özelliğine eşit şekilde uygulanır. Bir diğer ifade ile söz konusu ilke, mümkün varlıklar için de aynı şekilde geçerlidir. Araştırma “gayr” kavramının Arap dilbiliminde aslî olarak olumsuzlama anlamına gelmediğini, aslında bir sıfat olduğunu ve aynı zamanda istisnaî cümle oluşturma işlevi gördüğünü iddia eden dilbilimsel bir tartışmayla başlamaktadır. Bu da ilâhî sıfatlara ilişkin ilkenin, temel dilbilimsel düzeyde bile üçüncü halin imkânsızlığı anlamına gelmediğini kanıtlamaktadır. Akabinde “gayr” kavramı kelâmî n. Söz konusu inceleme kendisini herhangi bir ekolle sınırlı değildir, ancak inceleme dört ana kaynağa dayanmaktadır: (1) Mu'tezileden Ka‘bî'nin Makâlât'ı; (2) Eş‘arî'nin Makâlât'ı ve (3) Mâtürîdî'nin Kitâbu't-Tevhîd ve (4) Te’vîlât. Bazı yazarların Mâtürîdî'nin üçüncü halin imkânsızlığı yasasının inkârını îmâ eden özgün bir duruşa sahip olduğunu iddia etmeleri nedeniyle, sonuncusu üzerinde daha fazla duruldu. Böylesi bir ilkenin mantık yasalarının inkârını îmâ ettiğine dair hiçbir belirti yoktur. Aksini iddia edenler, böyle mantıksız bir görüş için felsefi gerekçelendirme bir yana, yorumları için herhangi bir dilbilimsel veya metinsel kanıt bile sunamamıştır. (shrink)

This article examines the development and critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. There are two basic positions on analogical arguments: (i) one holds that if analogical arguments yield certainty, then they are analyzable as deductive inferences, rendering the analogy itself redundant. Proponents of this view thus hold that if the analogy is useful at all, it will never yield the certainty demanded in the rational sciences; (ii) another holds that the analogy remains useful even when the argument is (...) deductively sound, either because the universal premise is epistemically dependent on the source case, or, because the source case is useful in dialectical contexts. The exploration of these themes will center around Juwaynī’s formalization and subsequent critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. (shrink)